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Learning from Failure:
Big Data Analysis for Detecting the Patterns
of Failure in Innovative Startups
Maddalena Cavicchioli1,* and Ulpiana Kocollari2
Abstract
This article aims at identifying appropriate models for analyzing large datasets to serve a twofold goal: first, to
better understand the dynamics impacting innovative startups’ performance and their managerial practice
and, second, to detect their patterns of failure. Therefore, we investigate the interaction of economic–financial,
context, and governance dimensions of 4185 Italian innovative startups created from 2012 to 2015. Once startups
have been grouped, we focus only on those that are unsuccessful. Then, failure patterns have been uncovered,
integrating the use of factor and cluster analysis, where factor scores for each firm are used to identify a set of
homogeneous groups based on clustering methods. The integrated use of those large-dimensional data tech-
niques permits to classify items in rigorous ways and to unfold structures of the data, which are not apparent in
the beginning. The analysis suggests that each pattern of failure is a multidimensional construct and, as a con-
sequence can generate different managerial implications. Therefore, an effective handling of failure requires
management to use appropriate interventions targeted at the challenges faced by that particular pattern of fail-
ure in the age of different firms.
Keywords: big data techniques; cluster analysis; factor analysis; failure patterns; innovative startups
Big Data in Management
A review of the recent literature
Although there is no unanimous definition of big data,
there is a widely accepted awareness about the need to
distinguish big data from what is commonly intended
to be a large database. To the concept of big data are
usually related three Vs, namely volume, variety, and
velocity, which were introduced to better define and
understand this notion.1–3 Their analysis has become
a promising practice in business involving a combi-
nation of diverse datasets and advanced analytic
techniques that play an important role in influencing
many aspects of business activities. With larger cate-
gories of data that can be collected and interpreted,
companies are able to identify and answer better to
markets’ and stakeholders’ requests. Further, the use
of new techniques with higher performance and flex-
ibility can meet the demand of more effective and
efficient decision-making processes. In fact, the ap-
plication of big data in organizations is influencing
managerial practices and processes that are changing
decision-making strategy, firms’ culture, leadership,
human resource management, and other management
practices.4
According to the review of the literature carried out
by Sheng et al.,3 which examines the use of big data in
business and management, eight main areas can be
identified: general management, information manage-
ment, marketing, operation research and management
science, organization, industry study, and public sector
study. The authors report that most of the studies apply
the big data-driven approach in marketing activities
and operational practices. On the contrary, only a few
articles consider big data from a wider managerial per-
spective that investigates the strategic importance of
their predictive use.
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All the analyzed studies3,5 reveal a growing interest
and still great needs and space for big data research
in the management sphere. Therefore, there are many
opportunities and benefits that need to be explored
for big data analysis in management development
and business improvement.
In the light of these considerations, we argue that
better predictions can be rooted in the big data elabo-
ration instead of entrepreneurship instinct and experi-
ence, so that the data-driven approach can improve
business performance.6 This is even more true in the
case of new ventures.7
Methods for analyzing big data
In the abstract of his 2001 paper in Statistical Science,8
the statistician Leo Breiman writes about the difference
between model-based and algorithmic approaches to
statistics: ‘‘There are two cultures in the use of statistical
modeling to reach conclusions from data. One assumes
that the data are generated by a given stochastic data
model. The other uses algorithmic models and treats
the data mechanism as unknown’’ (p. 199).
However, nowadays it is largely accepted that ma-
chine learning (ML), to which Breiman refers to as
the algorithm modeling culture, may stand alongside
with more traditional statistical methods.9,10 Although
the adoption of these methods in economics and man-
agement has been slower, they are now beginning to be
widely used in empirical work and are the topic of a
rapidly increasing methodological literature. Although
relevant more generally, the methods developed in the
ML literature have been particularly successful in big
data settings, where we observe information on a
large number of units, many pieces of information on
each unit, or both, and often outside the simple setting
with a single cross-section of units.
Even though there are cases where using simple off-
the-shelf algorithms from the ML literature can be effec-
tive, there are also many cases where this is not the case.
The ML techniques often require careful tuning and ad-
aptation to effectively address the specific problems that
economists are interested in. Perhaps the most impor-
tant type of adaptation is to exploit the structure of
the problems. Statistics and econometrics have tradi-
tionally placed much emphasis on these structures and
developed insights to exploit them with traditional
structural modeling, whereas ML has often placed little
emphasis on them. However, a combination of the two
approaches is what is needed to unfold complicated
structures from a large multidimensional set of data.
The Case of Innovative Startups:
The Importance of Combining Economic
and External Context Data
Italian innovative startups
This study examines the set of startups in Italy. Over
the past decades, this country has witnessed first the in-
troduction and then the expansion of innovative busi-
ness models for new ventures, in a variety of forms, as
an integral part of its economic context. The scenario
has been further reinforced by the creation of new
legal forms of organizations that are absolute firsts on
the international economic stage. In the sequel, we pro-
vide a brief overview of the new form of enterprise in-
troduced during the past few years, to highlight the
opportunities and needs that it implies.
One very interesting category of startup examined in
this study is that of innovative ones. The Italian Decree
Law 179/2012 introduced a new body of legislation
governing the foundation and growth of innovative
startups. Specifically, article 25, subsection 2 defines an in-
novative startup as a capital enterprise, which may also
be a cooperative, incorporated under Italian law, shares
or stakes that are not listed on a regulated market or
on a multilateral trading system, which meets specific
requirements. Within this broader definition of an inno-
vative startup, the law identifies two additional types of
enterprise that are awarded greater fiscal benefits for
their potential investors: startups with social goals and
high-tech startups in the energy industry.
We are, therefore, looking at a type of enterprise that
has distinct characteristics from its foundation and is
then in need of a measurement process capable of iden-
tifying, calculating, and monitoring its potential. This
measurement process should integrate the company’s
economic performance and its context variables.
From an operational point of view, an innovative
startup must meet all the criteria for a startup and also
fulfil an additional condition related to its innovation in
its area of business, to be qualified as such. In particular,
for innovative startups it is mandatory to comply with the
‘‘cumulative’’ prerequisites (meaning that they must all be
fulfilled) listed in the aforesaid article 25, subsection 2,
and the ‘‘alternative’’ prerequisites at the same point.
Those cumulative prerequisites are summarized next:
 The company must have been incorporated, and
have been engaging in the business concerned,
for no more than 60 months, meaning 5 years;
 it must have its registered office and operations
center in Italy;














































 from the innovative startup’s second year in busi-
ness, the total value of annual production must
not exceed 5 million euros;
 it must not distribute or have distributed profits;
 its exclusive or prevalent corporate purpose must
be the development, production, and sale of inno-
vative, high-tech products or service;
 it must not have been incorporated from a merger
or corporate break-up, or further to the transfer of
ownership of a company or company division;
 it must operate in the sectors envisaged by the law.
Moving on to the second category of requirements
(which are alternatives), the law requires the com-
pany to fulfil at least one of the following condi-
tions:
 It must spend at least 15% of the cost or total value
of its production (whichever is greater) on re-
search and development;
 at least one-third of the total workforce must con-
sist of highly qualified people, who may be formal
employees or freelance associates of any kind;
 it must be the owner, registered holder, or licensee
of at least one patent.
These characteristics imply specific expedients for
analyzing and evaluating the activities of these firms.
In particular, a set of qualitative context variables are
added to the traditional economic and financial criteria
to identify their innovative activities.
Investigating the innovative startups’
performance and failure
Measuring the performance of startups is an important
task, as they can be a source of stable job creation. Fur-
ther, startups’ improvement in performance is critical
to their survival and growth.11 The dimensions that
are most frequently used by researchers, such as annual
revenues, growth in sales, and number of employees
alone are not enough to explain and detect startups’ de-
velopment paths. According to Chorev and Andersin,12
the success of a firm can often be influenced by external
factors such as the government support,13 competitive
rivalry, innovation, and industry.14 The external forces,
combined with the economic internal ones, may act as
a driver behind the growth or failure of a new venture.
In fact, a growing body of research has focused on the
external environmental conditions15,16 as the elements
that might condition the success or failure of a startup.
In this light, we particularly consider in our study: the
geographic location of the startup, as it can benefit a
specific government’s support that facilitates growth
in that area17 or can help firms to be close to strategic
suppliers and customers16; the industry category since
startups of the same industry have similar behaviors to-
ward technological changes and toward growth.14 A set
of variables that are representative of ownership and/or
corporate governance characteristics are also consid-
ered with regard to the managerial experience of the
owners and the governance models that can influence
performance.18–21
Unlike established firms, which have consolidated
models for analyzing their level of viability and sur-
vival, new ventures are subject to a liability of newness
where their survival is a critical issue.22 In particular,
understanding new business failure still represents a
challenge for researchers since most studies deal with
prediction of failure23 and only a few focus on its un-
derstanding. Most of these prediction models depend
on accurate quantitative data over several years before
failure24 that are problematic, especially for startups
and small ventures that are known to be weak in finan-
cial data records. Further, the multidimensional nature
of failure implies that numerous variables of a nonfi-
nancial kind should be analyzed for marking the causes
of failure.25 In their investigation and analysis of bank-
rupt firms, Thornhill and Amit26 compared industry
change, general management, financial management,
and market development variables associated with dif-
ferent stages of business development and suggest that
young firms are more likely to suffer from resource and
capability deficiencies than older firms, which is es-
sence of the ‘‘liability of newness.’’25,27
A firm’s failure generally does not stem from a single
factor but it is the result from an accumulation of deci-
sions, actions, and commitments that become knotted
in self-perpetuating dynamics.28 A precondition refers
to conditions that must exist or be established before
something can occur, thus it is a prerequisite. Francis
and Desai29 refer to preconditions as contextual fac-
tors. Therefore, the contextual factors as triggers of fail-
ure are specifically relevant for understanding decline.
All these studies underline the relevance of external
variables for the analysis of startups’ development,
warning that a combination of different factors can bet-
ter explain why new ventures succeed or fail. From a
methodological perspective, the need of a new frame-
work rises, to combine both the two dimensions: eco-
nomic/financial and context/external.
Motivated by those reasons, the aim of this article is to
implement data-mining techniques to better understand














































the dynamics of economic, context, and governance di-
mensions and their influence over the innovative start-
ups’ performance and finally detect different patterns
of failure. We focus on financial, governance, and con-
text data of all 4185 Italian innovative startups created
from 2012 to 2015. We first use the data-mining cluster-
ing technique to identify groups of startups that show
similar behavior. Second, we focus only on those unsuc-
cessful startups where failure patterns have been uncov-
ered, integrating the use of factor and cluster analyses.
Those techniques are, in fact, useful in reducing both
the variables’ dimension and the units’ dimension. Par-
ticularly, factor analysis is able to synthetize a variety of
collected aspects (the multivariate collection of data)
into a few latent dimensions that are non-redundant ex-
pressions of the initial variables. Then, groups are
formed by using cluster analyses, where the factor scores
for each firm are used to identify a set of homogenous
groups.
Analysis on Large Multidimensional Data
Methodology for data mining
Given the quantity and variety of variables, the need to
reduce and synthesize their multidimensionality has
been taken into account in the selection and construc-
tion of the methodology used for data processing and
for their analysis. To detect failure patterns, two differ-
ent statistical approaches are applied to identify differ-
ent processes. Particularly, the analysis is based on the
integrated use of factor and cluster analyses, where the
factor scores for each firm are used to identify a set of
homogenous groups based on cluster analysis. For fac-
tor analysis, the unweighted least-squares extraction
method with varimax rotation is used and the number
of factors is determined by using the eigenvalues ex-
ceeding one rule. For the subsequent cluster analysis,
K-medians clustering is chosen by using the L2/Eucli-
dian dissimilarity measure and initial group centers
are selected as K well-spaced observations. Cluster
analysis was conducted with different K values starting
from 2 and evaluated with the R2 criterion.
A major topic in the ML literature is unsupervised
learning. In this stream of the literature enters k-means
clustering,30,31 whose goal is, given a set of observations
on different aspects Xi, to partition the feature space into
subspaces. Those subspaces should be obtained by hav-
ing units that are homogeneous within the cluster and
as much heterogenous between clusters.
Consider the case where we wish to partition the ini-
tial space into G subspaces or clusters. We start choos-
ing centroids c1, . . . , cG and then assign units to the
cluster based on their proximity to the centroids. The
algorithm works as follows. We start with a set of G
centroids, c1, . . . , cG, elements of the initial space that
are sufficiently separated over this space. Given a set
of centroids, we assign each unit to the cluster that
minimizes the distance between the unit and the cen-
troid of the cluster:
Ci = arg min
g2 1, ..., Gf g
jj Xi cg jj2:
Then, we update the centroids as the average of the






We repeatedly iterate between the previous two
steps. The choice of the number of clusters is not a
straightforward task, because there is no direct cross-
validation method to assess the performance of one
value versus the other. It is common use to compare
the value of the index R2, computed as 1 minus the
ratio between the variance within clusters over the
total variance, adjusted by degrees of freedom.
Data and results
As a first step, we analyzed the context variables of all
the innovative startups active in Italy at the date of
the investigation. We consider the extensive popula-
tion of 4185 innovative startups in Italy in 2015,
using firm-level data obtained from Aida Bureau van
Dijk database. The set of variables used to classify items
are categories of geographical areas, industry, number
of startups’ shareholders, and number of startups’ share-
holders that are also managers. Their characterization
in terms of geographical areas and industry is reported
in Figure 1.
With regards to the number of shareholders, the fre-
quency distributions is 0: 7.5%, 1–2: 37.2%, 3–7: 45.5%,
>7: 9.7%. Finally, in terms of shareholders that are also
managers, the distribution is 0: 52.8%, 1: 27.2%, 2:
18.2%, >2: 1.8%.
Based on those four context variables, items are clas-
sified by using K-means methodology, as presented in
the previous subsection. To identify the number of
clusters, we make use of the R2 index, computed as 1
minus the ratio between the variance within clusters
over the total variance, adjusted by degrees of freedom.
For a number of clusters G equal to 2, the R2 is equal to














































0.7938; whereas for G = 3, the index jumps at 0.9905,
which indicates an almost perfect partition. So, we
stay at G = 3 clusters and convergence is reached after
five iterations. The first identified cluster is a subset
of 1222 startups mainly located in the center and
south area (88%), belonging to the tertiary industry
for the 83%, with the lowest number of managers
(zero at the 86%) and a number of shareholders greatly
above the mean value. With regards to the economic
features, they are characterized by low revenues and
at the same time low indebtedness.
The second cluster is the most numerous (2152 U),
with all of them located in the north of Italy and active
in the tertiary (77%) and secondary (22%) sectors. They
are characterized by having up to one single manager
(79%) and a number of shareholders greatly above
the mean value. In particular, they show higher reve-
nues with respect to the other two clusters and an av-
erage level of indebtedness.
The third group is composed by 811 startups, mainly
in the tertiary sector (81%) and present in the center-
south of Italy (96%). Differently from the first cluster,
they are characterized by having a low number of
shareholders and the higher number of managers.
They have obtained good revenues (but less than the
second cluster) with an average level of indebtedness.
With particular attention to the failed startups in the
three groups, we observe that in the first cluster there
are no failed startups, in the second there are only
4% failed ones, whereas in the third the number of
FIG. 1. Distributions of the cases with respect to geographical areas (left) and industry (right).
FIG. 2. Scatterplots of identified clusters with respect to two economic dimensions (revenues on the x-axis
and indebtedness on the y-axis), highlighting the failed startups (black dots) and the nonfailed ones (grey
dots).














































failed startups reaches 14%. This is shown graphically
in Figure 2, which also reports the two economic di-
mensions: levels of revenue and indebtedness.
There results show three distinct clusters and two
main categories of failure. However, although it is un-
deniable that external forces are relevant for the analy-
sis of startups’ paths of development, these factors
alone are not sufficient to explain the processes stand-
ing behind new ventures’ survival or failure. Further,
deep investigation combining these context variables
with further economic/financial indicators is needed.
Detecting the Patterns of Failure
in Innovative Startups
After the detection of the failure main cluster and its
main characteristics, in this section, we analyze the
failed startups considering both their economic and
context variables to identify multifaceted patterns of
failure. When only bankrupted startups are included
in the analysis (particularly those founded in 2012
and bankrupted at the latest in 2015, which are actually
present in clusters 2 and 3), the considered variables are
reported and described in Table 1.
Overall, 23.2% of the failed startups are located in
the North-East area, 35% in the North-West area,
23.2% in the center of Italy, and 18.6% in the South (in-
cluding the two main islands of Sicily and Sardinia).
With regard to industry, 36% of them belong to the
service industry, 44.3% to the Information and Com-
munications Technology (ICT) industry, 13.8% to the
manufacturing sector, 4.9% are trading firms, and the
remaining 1% belong to the agricultural sector.
The extracted failure processes based on the consec-
utive application of factor and cluster analysis are
reported in Table 2. The first things to notice are the
increase in the number of factors with the firm’s age
as well as the proportion of variance explained by fac-
tors; second, the decrease of the number of failure pro-
cesses as the firm’s age increases. In fact, the number of
different patterns of failure reduces from three to two
with the increase of the firm’s age.
Moreover, important evidence was found about the
presence of different patterns of failure in different sec-
tors for most firms’ age groups, whereas the patterns of
failure are not generally associated with the geograph-
ical area in which the startups are born. The numeros-
ity of shareholders features different patterns of failure
only in mature startups.
For all extracted failure processes, the respective me-
dian values for the variables in the study are examined
for different lifetimes and reported in Tables 3–6 next.
Failure processes for 1-year-old firms are clearly dis-
tinct in the two most numerous clusters in which the
‘‘symptoms’’ clearly symbolize acute failure. In particular,
the firms belonging to one main cluster are characterized
by low performance (net income to total assets [NIA]:
24.6% and earnings before interest, taxes, amortisation
and depreciation [EBITA]: 23.6%), whereas the others
in the second main cluster are characterized by poor fi-
nancial structure (current assets/current liabilities · 100
[CACL]: 26.2% and cash and equivalents/current lia-
bilities · 100 [CCL]: 21%). These distinctive character-
istics are also reported in the management structure of
Table 1. Tag and description of the variables in the study
Variable Description
NIA Net income to total assets
EBITA Earnings before interest, taxes, amortization,
and depreciation
DA Total debt to total assets ratio
SA Turnover/total assets
CACL Current assets/current liabilities · 100
CCL Cash and equivalents/current liabilities · 100
NWCA (Current assets  current liabilities)/total assets · 100
EBITI Earnings before interest and taxes/financial expenses
Nr. SRH Total number of shareholders
Nr. EMP Total number of employees
Nr. Mng Number of shareholders that are managers
INDUSTRY 1-Manifacturing; 2-Services; 3-ICT; 4-Commerce;
5-Agriculture
AREA Geographical area in which the startup operates
Note that industry’s categories are further specified into five classes.














1 3; 76.8 0.000 28 (50%) 1 (2%) 27 (48%) 0.74 56
2 6; 83.8 0.000 3 (5%) 50 (79%) 10 (16%) 0.86 63
3 8; 88.6 0.000 9 (24%) 28 (76%) 0.63 37
4 9; 90.7 0.000 5 (21%) 19 (79%) 0.71 24














































the two main clusters. In fact, in the first main cluster the
shareholders, who are also managers, are less than in the
majority of firms in the second main cluster.
The failure processes detected for 2-year-old firms,
similarly to the previous group, are three.
Considering the industries in which the firms of each
cluster operate, a distinction can be made: The firms of
the first cluster are all manufacturing ones, those of the
third cluster are mainly (60%) ICT innovative ventures,
and the second cluster is a mixed one. The failed
manufacturing firms of the first cluster are character-
ized by negative profitability (NIA second year:
2.83), very low liquidity [CCL of the second year:
53.7%; (Current assets  current liabilities)/total as-
sets · 100 (NWCA) of the second year: 243%], and
unsustainable financial structure (total debt to total
Table 3. Median of variables in different failure processes
for 1-year-old firms
Variable/failure
process (share) 1.1 (50%) 1.2 (2%) 1.3 (48%)
NIA 21.49% 61.95% 24.58%
EBITA 20.59% 60.46% 23.59%
DA 0.86 1.31 0.84
SA 0.21 0.14 0.22
CACL 26.23% 707.88% 0.99%
CCL 20.85% 701.99% 4.37%
NWCA 61.15% 242.22% 54.45%
EBITI 0.07 0.90 0.10
CACL, current assets/current liabilities · 100; CCL, cash and equiva-
lents/current liabilities · 100; DA, total debt to total assets ratio; EBITA,
earnings before interest, taxes, amortisation and depreciation; EBITI,
earnings before interest and taxes/financial expenses; NWCA, (Current
assets  current liabilities)/total assets · 100; ML, machine learning;
NIA, net income to total assets; SA, turnover/total assets.
Table 4. Median of variables in different failure processes
for 2-year-old firms
Variable/failure
process (share) 2.1 (5%) 2.2 (79%) 2.3 (16%)
NIA1 20.32% 8.66% 37.22%
NIA2 283.44% 9.64% 36.83%
EBITA1 16.00% 8.54% 37.90%
EBITA2 284.30% 9.28% 38.90%
DA1 0.90 0.04 0.09
DA2 2.38 0.18 0.17
SA1 0.63 0.12 0.79
SA2 0.63 0.13 0.82
CACL1 23.35% 1.21% 0.98%
CACL2 48.17% 23.23% 130.61%
CCL1 42.70% 4.43% 9.33%
CCL2 53.72% 22.32% 127.70%
NWCA1 198.90% 5.71% 31.11%
NWCA2 242.57% 4.29% 51.31%
EBITI1 2.10 0.10 0.14
EBITI2 2.23 0.07 0.32
Table 5. Median of variables in different failure processes
for 3-year-old firms
Variable/failure

























Table 6. Median of variables in different failure processes
for 4-year-old firms
Variable/failure















































































assets ratio [DA] of the second year: 2.38) 1 year before
failure. The third group of firms (mainly ICT) shows a
pattern of slight growth (DEBITA: 1%) but remains un-
sustainable in terms of financial structure (DCACL:
128%, DCCL: 118%). Finally, the second group is dif-
ferent in the sharp change when passing from the
first to the second year both in performance and in fi-
nancial structure that is not sufficient to sustain the
scaling of the activity.
For 3-year-old firms, only two patterns were detected.
The first cluster figures out a clear poor performance
after the first year of activity (DNIA of the second year:
70%, DEBITA of the second year: 22%). Financial ratios
show a break indicated by the sharp decline of the ratios
2 years before failure (DCACL of the second year:
45%, DDA of the second year: 0.7). This trend is
also registered in the second cluster but the first pattern
differs from the second one mostly with respect to the
entity of the ratios’ difference in the last years of the ac-
tivity (DCACL of the third year:35%, DDA of the sec-
ond year: 0.20, and DDA of the third year: 0.02). This
difference can be attributed to the characteristics of
the governance structure. In fact, in the second cluster
we observe the presence of more management compe-
tencies through the owners of the firms, whereas the
first cluster counts a maximum of one manager that is
also a shareholder of the startup.
Four-year-old firms also witness two different failure
processes.
Both groups of firms have a remarkably lower pro-
ductivity of assets [mean of turnover/total assets (SA)
over the 4 years: 0.25  first cluster, mean of SA over
the 4 years: 0.07  second cluster]. In the first pattern,
a gradual decline is shown in case of financial ratios,
which worsen and attain poor values 1 year before fail-
ure (DCACL of the last year: 49%, DDA of the last year:
0.14). In case of the second and more numerous pro-
cess, the downturn starts much earlier and many finan-
cial ratios have low values throughout the startups’
entire life cycle (mean of CACL over the 4 years:
11% mean of DA over the 4 years: 0.05). Note that
one characteristic of the more long-lived firms is to
be located in the North (67%) with respect to any
other areas. This fact underlines the importance of
the context that accentuates the existence of an ecosys-
tem that supports entrepreneurial projects.
Conclusions
We apply data-mining techniques to uncover groups
and patterns of failure in the context of Italian innova-
tive startups. The patterns of firms’ performance iden-
tified with our analysis favor the use of different
dimensions characterizing startups’ life, such as eco-
nomic–financial indicators and context data. We are
able to conclude that it is reasonable to argue that un-
derstanding failure for startups has utility for detecting
patterns, which differ in terms of economic, context,
and governance dimensions. Of course, there will be
common features that transcend the various patterns
of failure, as the startup phases of business will inevita-
bly carry with them vestiges of the business idea and
the financial structure. Some features such as financing
issues are relatively persistent, despite the changing
needs as startups move from one stage to another.
However, other features are unique to each pattern
since the main issues in which the startup’s decision-
making process takes place will change significantly
over the different stages of business idea development.
These elements, if contextualized, can pinpoint the
presence of facts or conditions that mark the possible
causes of failure and they can be referred to as ‘‘warning
signs,’’ which are not evident if considered detached
from the process in which they occur. Even if the
detected features cannot predict failure per se, they
might be considered as purely indicators that failure
causes are present within a certain context. With the
patterns we identified, we can provide some more spe-
cific recommendations for the industry to predict the
startups’ failure. For example, using the patterns repre-
sented in the Cluster 4.1 and 4.2 we can individuate the
following ‘‘warning signs.’’
The failure pattern outlined in Cluster 4.1 appears
evident: The destruction of wealth, resulting from neg-
ative profitability, is not mitigated by the constant re-
duction in debt; short-term liabilities have been used
to finance fixed investments with a consequent situa-
tion of financial liquidity difficulties. In other words,
the innovative startups of Cluster 4.1 have tried to re-
store their equilibrium, after the decrease in profitabil-
ity, only through the increase in current liabilities,
instead of acting also on business costs, in a structural
way. This was accompanied by an increase in the inci-
dence of current assets on total net assets, which
resulted in an increase in suspended costs (inventories)
and noncollections (commercial credits).
The pattern of failure of the innovative companies in
Cluster 4.2 is primarily influenced, unlike Cluster 4.1,
by the type of governance adopted; in particular,
these firms have a greater number of managers and em-
ployees. Profitability is positive and innovative startups














































have a good margin on sales, but the situation regarding
the turnover of invested capital is critical; in fact, in
terms of speed if disinvestment of a firm’s resources
is slow, that is, innovative startups are not able to ex-
ploit the resources invested and, in particular, their pro-
duction capacity. This is combined with the increase in
debt year after year, since there is a need to remedy a vol-
ume of activity that is not appropriate to the structure
(oversizing) and it should be noted that the increase in
the use of debt capital is also due to the management
of net working capital, which shows a short-term asset
that does not cover short-term liabilities (as a result,
short-term payments have been met by a reduction in
long-term debt).
Summing up the study identifies the spread of two
phenomena, which presents the Italian startup ecosys-
tem: ‘‘dwarfism’’ and the presence of so-called ‘‘zom-
bie startups.’’ Dwarfism represents the situation in
which startups do not fully develop their growth
potential, that is, they do not enter the expansion
phase; this is the case of subcontracting companies,
which have become specialized cooperators and sup-
pliers of innovative components. On the contrary,
zombie startups are innovative startups that survive
beyond 3 years with minimal turnover and activity,
compared with the legislative framework. Their pres-
ence is reflected on the scarce investments in research
and innovation, since they are not productive and ab-
sorb capital.
Therefore, by studying the patterns of failure as a
mix of profitability, context, and governance dynamics
over the different age of failure, this work adds a com-
plementary perspective to the current state of knowl-
edge on startups’ failure. The possibility to consider
at the same time various aspects of a phenomenon be-
comes an advantage if opportune techniques are put in
place. In fact, to detect and monitor early warning sig-
nals that could lead to failure, entrepreneurs should
have clear the main patterns of failure that their busi-
ness is mostly exposed to. This could be done having
in mind specific models for analyzing a large amount
of data that are able to synthetize the multidimension-
ality of the phenomenon into a few determinants of the
business and its stage.
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